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Battle for top 10 (protected) draft picks in 2016 draft
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Post by ethanbein on Aug 5, 2015 12:31:09 GMT -5
This isn't really true. The average #5 pick is significantly better than the average #10 pick. One estimate has the #5 pick at about 40% more WAR over the team controlled years. Yeah, draft picks are crapshoots in general, but the top picks are significantly better bets than picks even a bit lower. Your link isn't working for me either, but based on this the expected difference between the 5th and 10th pick over their first 6 years averages about 2.5 WAR. Less for pitchers and high schoolers, more for hitters and players drafted out of college. Compared to the benefit of finishing this season on a positive note and having everyone's individual performance improve - 2.5 WAR over 6 years is a very small price to pay. Average expected WAR by pick and pick type: 5th Pick 7th Pick 10th Pick HS P 4.2 3.5 2.9 HS H 9.1 7.6 6.2 C P 6.7 5.6 4.6 C H 11.6 9.7 8.0 7.9 6.6 5.4 This is the link I was trying to add - sorry about that, I must have done it wrong on my phone. The 40% number comes from his exponential decay model based on draft pick. Yeah, it's only a few WAR difference, but that's just because all draft picks have pretty low averages. I agree that I would rather have us end the season on a high note (with sustainably good performances from players who will be on next year's team), but #5 is still a significantly better place to be than #10, just draft wise.
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Post by redsox04071318champs on Aug 5, 2015 12:41:47 GMT -5
They know Betts and Tazawa will be the back end of the bullpen. The rest of the pen needs a lot of restructuring. It's worse than we thought! I guess we'll need a center fielder then, too. Doohh! That's what I get for posting when I should be sleeping instead. On the other hand, Betts couldn't pitch must worse than the non-Japanese pitchers they already have in the pen. And if Betts the pitcher gives up a fly ball to center, I have no doubt with his speed, he can run back there and go get it.
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Post by jmei on Aug 5, 2015 12:51:34 GMT -5
Your link isn't working for me either, but based on this the expected difference between the 5th and 10th pick over their first 6 years averages about 2.5 WAR. Less for pitchers and high schoolers, more for hitters and players drafted out of college. Compared to the benefit of finishing this season on a positive note and having everyone's individual performance improve - 2.5 WAR over 6 years is a very small price to pay. Average expected WAR by pick and pick type: 5th Pick 7th Pick 10th Pick HS P 4.2 3.5 2.9 HS H 9.1 7.6 6.2 C P 6.7 5.6 4.6 C H 11.6 9.7 8.0 7.9 6.6 5.4 This is the link I was trying to add - sorry about that, I must have done it wrong on my phone. The 40% number comes from his exponential decay model based on draft pick. Yeah, it's only a few WAR difference, but that's just because all draft picks have pretty low averages. I agree that I would rather have us end the season on a high note (with sustainably good performances from players who will be on next year's team), but #5 is still a significantly better place to be than #10, just draft wise. On a percentage basis, sure, but on an absolute basis, it's not much.
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Post by burythehammer on Aug 5, 2015 13:04:25 GMT -5
Worth noting that the typical difference between the fifth pick in the draft and the tenth pick in the draft is pretty minor. Yes, every once in a while you miss a stud by a couple picks. But more often than not, there's not a huge difference in the kind of player you'd get between #5 and #10. The flaw here is that you're overlooking the fact that there is close to zero long-term benefit to winning games when you are in non-contention. Certainly not enough benefit to outweigh even a marginal increase in chance of getting a better player in the draft.
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Post by jmei on Aug 5, 2015 13:14:51 GMT -5
Worth noting that the typical difference between the fifth pick in the draft and the tenth pick in the draft is pretty minor. Yes, every once in a while you miss a stud by a couple picks. But more often than not, there's not a huge difference in the kind of player you'd get between #5 and #10. The flaw here is that you're overlooking the fact that there is close to zero long-term benefit to winning games when you are in non-contention. Certainly not enough benefit to outweigh even a marginal increase in chance of getting a better player in the draft. There is plenty of short-term benefit, though, considering much of next year's roster will be identical to this year's roster. If they're winning additional games, it means the players on the team are performing better, which means next year's team will project to perform better than we had previously thought. If you apply any sort of discount rate (as you should; just about every organization which wants to contend next year values 2016 wins significantly more than 2019+ wins), my intuition is that the short-term benefits probably outweigh any long-term benefits of marginal improvement in draft position, even if two months of good performance shouldn't affect 2016 projections too much.
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Post by James Dunne on Aug 5, 2015 13:17:48 GMT -5
Worth noting that the typical difference between the fifth pick in the draft and the tenth pick in the draft is pretty minor. Yes, every once in a while you miss a stud by a couple picks. But more often than not, there's not a huge difference in the kind of player you'd get between #5 and #10. The flaw here is that you're overlooking the fact that there is close to zero long-term benefit to winning games when you are in non-contention. Certainly not enough benefit to outweigh even a marginal increase in chance of getting a better player in the draft. But it then follows that the flaw in that thinking is that the marginal increase you get from getting a player in the draft is worth much if all your players are so bad that you can't win games ever. If Bogaerts, Betts, Owens, Rodriguez, Wright, Castillo, Swihart (and Sandoval and Ramirez and Porcello and Miley for that matter) are bad then the marginal improvement is of a minor concern. If that core plays well down the stretch then it is a sign that they have a chance to be a contending team in 2016-2019. To put it more simply, there's a real chance that Betts produces more value in the next two months than their 2016 draft pick, even if it ends up being #3 overall, produces in his career.
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Post by burythehammer on Aug 5, 2015 13:44:55 GMT -5
I didn't say marginal improvement, I said marginal increase in chance of getting a great player, which if they did would FAR outweigh any benefit to a few guys playing well down the stretch in meaningless games.
I already said, I am rooting for all of those guys to play well. And then in the late innings when we have a lead, I'll be rooting for bad luck/the bullpen to blow it every single time. And you can't give me any argument against that other than the "winning culture" thing, which is a joke anyway when you're talking about a last place team. I know that's anathema to some people just in terms of being a fan, and I totally get that, but for me it's the only way to look at it.
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Post by jmei on Aug 5, 2015 13:57:42 GMT -5
I didn't say marginal improvement, I said marginal increase in chance of getting a great player, which if they did would FAR outweigh any benefit to a few guys playing well down the stretch in meaningless games. Eh, the odds of drafting a great player at 5 or 10 are pretty low, and the odds of the difference between those picks being the difference between drafting a great player and not drafting a great player are even lower. It's like McDonald's monopoly-- sure, there's always a chance that extra order of large fries lucks you into Broadway and winning a million bucks, but odds are the worst that's going to happen is you're just going to miss out on a free soft serve.
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Post by jrffam05 on Aug 5, 2015 14:00:52 GMT -5
I really wish people on this board would stop rooting for us to lose so we could start winning....
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Post by burythehammer on Aug 5, 2015 14:47:46 GMT -5
I don't doubt that you're right jmei, but at the risk of going in circles, I see no downside to losing as many games as possible in these last two months. Agree to disagree.
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Post by thegoo13 on Aug 5, 2015 15:53:03 GMT -5
I didn't say marginal improvement, I said marginal increase in chance of getting a great player, which if they did would FAR outweigh any benefit to a few guys playing well down the stretch in meaningless games. Eh, the odds of drafting a great player at 5 or 10 are pretty low, and the odds of the difference between those picks being the difference between drafting a great player and not drafting a great player are even lower. It's like McDonald's monopoly-- sure, there's always a chance that extra order of large fries lucks you into Broadway and winning a million bucks, but odds are the worst that's going to happen is you're just going to miss out on a free soft serve. This is funny. Whatever the odds are the odds of drafting a great player at #5 are better than that odds at #10. Even better than at #20. Far better at #30 and above. I am not an advocate of losing just to lose. I agree, its not like the NBA where there seem to be only 3 or 4 guys a year that are difference makers. However, it is silly to not acknowledge common sense. The more good choices you have the better your odds of something good happening. Something that seems to be lost in the convo here. Sox are 5-13 since the break. Tied for the worst in baseball. JF continues to play ADA over Rusney Castillo. Once Betts comes back i am sure he will continue to play Napoli at 1B, Hanley in LF and ADA over JBJ and Rusney Castillo. Given all of that what marginal improvements am I hoping to see in the last two months of this season? Sure would be great to be in a position to draft that Oklahoma pitcher next year and then never draft in the top 20 again for the next 10 years minimum.
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Post by beantown on Aug 5, 2015 16:06:41 GMT -5
Can we all agree that we'd like the young studs/potential trade chips to do really well.. but have divine intervention (or breslow) curse us most of the time and yield us a 2-5 pick?? Seems like there's plenty of big arms at the top of this draft with #1/#2 starter hopes. Adding another RH flamethrower to join Kopech would be nice..
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Post by freddysthefuture2003 on Aug 7, 2015 10:40:27 GMT -5
Anyone else just see the clip of Riley Pint that Badler just Posted? #puntforPint
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Post by amfox1 on Aug 8, 2015 10:12:10 GMT -5
PHI and MIA are now tied for the worst record (PHI wins the tiebreaker). BOS in 6th.
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Post by bighead on Aug 8, 2015 11:07:56 GMT -5
PHI and MIA are now tied for the worst record (PHI wins the tiebreaker). BOS in 6th. We can do better than the 6th pick this year right? We NEED inside the top 3....
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Post by amfox1 on Aug 10, 2015 8:36:56 GMT -5
If the season ended right now, PHI would not have the 1st pick in the 2016 MLB draft, BOS would still have the 5th pick in the draft and SDO would have a top 10 pick:
1. MIA ---- 2. PHI -1.0 3. MIL -3.5 4. COL -4.5 5. BOS -6.0 6. CIN - 6.5 7. OAK -6.5 8. ATL -7.0 9. SDO -8.0 10. CLE -8.0 11. SEA -8.0 12. CHW -8.5 13. DET -10.5
(tiebreaker order of the above teams is COL, BOS, CHW, PHI, CIN, MIA, SDO, ATL, MIL, CLE, SEA, OAK, DET)
2.5 games separate #5 from #12.
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Post by burythehammer on Aug 10, 2015 20:01:24 GMT -5
The Phillies can screw up anything, huh.
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Post by ancientsoxfogey on Aug 10, 2015 21:15:51 GMT -5
If the season ended right now, PHI would not have the 1st pick in the 2016 MLB draft, BOS would still have the 5th pick in the draft and SDO would have a top 10 pick: 1. MIA ---- 2. PHI -1.0 3. MIL -3.5 4. COL -4.5 5. BOS -6.0 6. CIN - 6.5 7. OAK -6.5 8. ATL -7.0 9. SDO -8.0 10. CLE -8.0 11. SEA -8.0 12. CHW -8.5 13. DET -10.5 (tiebreaker order of the above teams is COL, BOS, CHW, PHI, CIN, MIA, SDO, ATL, MIL, CLE, SEA, OAK, DET)2.5 games separate #5 from #12. Well, let's see if losing Koji for the rest of the season is the straw that breaks the camel's back. At this point we're closer to losing a protected pick than we are moving from 5 to 3.
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Post by jodyreidnichols on Aug 10, 2015 22:39:28 GMT -5
The flaw here is that you're overlooking the fact that there is close to zero long-term benefit to winning games when you are in non-contention. Certainly not enough benefit to outweigh even a marginal increase in chance of getting a better player in the draft. There is plenty of short-term benefit, though, considering much of next year's roster will be identical to this year's roster. If they're winning additional games, it means the players on the team are performing better, which means next year's team will project to perform better than we had previously thought. If you apply any sort of discount rate (as you should; just about every organization which wants to contend next year values 2016 wins significantly more than 2019+ wins), my intuition is that the short-term benefits probably outweigh any long-term benefits of marginal improvement in draft position, even if two months of good performance shouldn't affect 2016 projections too much. I don't understand why we should be concerned with projections especially when several players vastly underperformed this seasons projections. Most projection systems would have these same players rebound but to a lesser degree than they are likely to actually rebound as last season is the biggest influence on any system. Any projection system is never what it actually claims (the median of that system) but is actually a range and with this becoming more than ever a young man's game projections are getting harder than ever. That all said I can't see why you wouldn't want the highest pick possible. Now with our closer gone for the season I'd love us to lose alot of close games and finish the final 50 a few (edit) additional games below .500. Short term gains that satisfy our own angst will have no real effect on the real world outcomes
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ericmvan
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Post by ericmvan on Aug 12, 2015 1:12:03 GMT -5
Kind of an insane day, in that the teams in positions 2 through 8 all lost while 9 through 12 all won.
Tm W L GB Phi 45 69 0 Mia 45 68 0.5 Mil 48 66 3 Col 47 64 3.5 Cin 49 62 5.5 Bos 50 63 5.5 Oak 51 63 6 Atl 51 62 6.5 Sea 53 61 8 Cle 52 59 8.5 SD 54 60 9 ChA 53 58 9.5 Det 54 59 9.5 Tex 55 56 11.5 Ari 56 56 12
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ericmvan
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Supposed to be working on something more important
Posts: 8,911
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Post by ericmvan on Aug 12, 2015 1:37:32 GMT -5
I think the best way to judge the value of a 5 pick versus a 10 pick is to look at potential value, which is to say, who you could have clearly drafted if you'd been smart enough -- so, best player drafted 5 to 9 versus 10 to 14, or (if you're particularly smart) 10 through 19. Obviously, if one of the latter players is better, you could take him with the 5 pick, but you'd have to be that much extra smart.
1998, #5 J.D. Drew (44.9 WAR) vs. #10 Carlos Pena (25.1) 1999, #9 Barry Zito (32.9) vs. #10 Ben Sheets (23.4) or #19 Alex Rios (27.8) 2000, #6 Rocco Baldelli (10.2 WAR) versus # 11 Dave Krynzel (0.2) or #15 Chase Utley (60.8) 2001, #5 Mark Teixiera (52.6) vs. #13 Casey Kotchman (7.5) 2002, #6 Zack Greinke (48.5) vs. #12 Joe Saunders (8.8) or #17 Cole Hamels (44.3) 2003, #7 Nick Markakis (26.9) vs. #13 Aaron Hill (23.2) 2004, #7 Homer Bailey (7.2) vs. #12 Jered Weaver (36.4) 2005, #7 Troy Tulowitzki (40.0) vs. # 11 Andrew McCutchen (37.1) 2006, #7 Clayton Kershaw (45.2) vs. # 11 Max Scherzer (29.2) 2007, #5 Matt Wieters (14.2) vs. #14 Jason Heyward (28.4) 2008, #5 Buster Posey (28.4) vs. #10 Jason Castro (8.6) or #16 Brett Lawrie (13.7)
It's interesting that the two guys taken 15-19 that were much better than anyone taken 10-14 were both taken by the Phillies in the span of three years. How times have changed ...
(Draft tidbit: Utley was the second college position player taken that year, out of UCLA. The first guy taken was Stanford's Joe Borchard (301 G, -1.5 WAR), by the White Sox at 12 ... probably the same scouts saw both players.)
Conclusion: nearly half of the time, a player goes 5 to 7 that is substantially better than what's left at the top of most draft boards thereafter.
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Post by Smittyw on Aug 12, 2015 6:01:21 GMT -5
Can we all agree that we'd like the young studs/potential trade chips to do really well.. but have divine intervention (or breslow) curse us most of the time and yield us a 2-5 pick?? Seems like there's plenty of big arms at the top of this draft with #1/#2 starter hopes. Adding another RH flamethrower to join Kopech would be nice.. Hmm...you might be onto something here.
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Post by burythehammer on Aug 12, 2015 6:21:46 GMT -5
I said this last year and I was right, so I'm predicting we end up at seven yet again. That spot is home for us :/
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Post by jimed14 on Aug 12, 2015 7:00:00 GMT -5
I think the best way to judge the value of a 5 pick versus a 10 pick is to look at potential value, which is to say, who you could have clearly drafted if you'd been smart enough -- so, best player drafted 5 to 9 versus 10 to 14, or (if you're particularly smart) 10 through 19. Obviously, if one of the latter players is better, you could take him with the 5 pick, but you'd have to be that much extra smart. 1998, #5 J.D. Drew (44.9 WAR) vs. #10 Carlos Pena (25.1) 1999, #9 Barry Zito (32.9) vs. #10 Ben Sheets (23.4) or #19 Alex Rios (27.8) 2000, #6 Rocco Baldelli (10.2 WAR) versus # 11 Dave Krynzel (0.2) or #15 Chase Utley (60.8) 2001, #5 Mark Teixiera (52.6) vs. #13 Casey Kotchman (7.5) 2002, #6 Zack Greinke (48.5) vs. #12 Joe Saunders (8.8) or #17 Cole Hamels (44.3) 2003, #7 Nick Markakis (26.9) vs. #13 Aaron Hill (23.2) 2004, #7 Homer Bailey (7.2) vs. #12 Jered Weaver (36.4) 2005, #7 Troy Tulowitzki (40.0) vs. # 11 Andrew McCutchen (37.1) 2006, #7 Clayton Kershaw (45.2) vs. # 11 Max Scherzer (29.2) 2007, #5 Matt Wieters (14.2) vs. #14 Jason Heyward (28.4) 2008, #5 Buster Posey (28.4) vs. #10 Jason Castro (8.6) or #16 Brett Lawrie (13.7) It's interesting that the two guys taken 15-19 that were much better than anyone taken 10-14 were both taken by the Phillies in the span of three years. How times have changed ... (Draft tidbit: Utley was the second college position player taken that year, out of UCLA. The first guy taken was Stanford's Joe Borchard (301 G, -1.5 WAR), by the White Sox at 12 ... probably the same scouts saw both players.) Conclusion: nearly half of the time, a player goes 5 to 7 that is substantially better than what's left at the top of most draft boards thereafter. I've said something similar to this before and it seems to be ignored, but all of those picks are before the draft pool cap. The value of picks is different depending on whether a team can save some money. If a team can save a million while drafting someone maybe one pick early, they might get a shot at five overslot guys in the top 200 later. The further down they are, the harder it is to save that much. And there is probably a good possibility that you get one decent player out of those five overslot guys.
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Post by ancientsoxfogey on Aug 12, 2015 7:24:05 GMT -5
I think the best way to judge the value of a 5 pick versus a 10 pick is to look at potential value, which is to say, who you could have clearly drafted if you'd been smart enough -- so, best player drafted 5 to 9 versus 10 to 14, or (if you're particularly smart) 10 through 19. Obviously, if one of the latter players is better, you could take him with the 5 pick, but you'd have to be that much extra smart. 1998, #5 J.D. Drew (44.9 WAR) vs. #10 Carlos Pena (25.1) 1999, #9 Barry Zito (32.9) vs. #10 Ben Sheets (23.4) or #19 Alex Rios (27.8) 2000, #6 Rocco Baldelli (10.2 WAR) versus # 11 Dave Krynzel (0.2) or #15 Chase Utley (60.8) 2001, #5 Mark Teixiera (52.6) vs. #13 Casey Kotchman (7.5) 2002, #6 Zack Greinke (48.5) vs. #12 Joe Saunders (8.8) or #17 Cole Hamels (44.3) 2003, #7 Nick Markakis (26.9) vs. #13 Aaron Hill (23.2) 2004, #7 Homer Bailey (7.2) vs. #12 Jered Weaver (36.4) 2005, #7 Troy Tulowitzki (40.0) vs. # 11 Andrew McCutchen (37.1) 2006, #7 Clayton Kershaw (45.2) vs. # 11 Max Scherzer (29.2) 2007, #5 Matt Wieters (14.2) vs. #14 Jason Heyward (28.4) 2008, #5 Buster Posey (28.4) vs. #10 Jason Castro (8.6) or #16 Brett Lawrie (13.7) It's interesting that the two guys taken 15-19 that were much better than anyone taken 10-14 were both taken by the Phillies in the span of three years. How times have changed ... (Draft tidbit: Utley was the second college position player taken that year, out of UCLA. The first guy taken was Stanford's Joe Borchard (301 G, -1.5 WAR), by the White Sox at 12 ... probably the same scouts saw both players.) Conclusion: nearly half of the time, a player goes 5 to 7 that is substantially better than what's left at the top of most draft boards thereafter. I don't know that I agree with this. This might be the best theoretical way to judge the value of an earlier versus a later pick, but the real world is the real world. The best actual value of an earlier versus a later pick has to take into account the inefficiencies of the selection process caused by the draft rules and the difficulty for even the best baseball minds to envision progression of a prospect when they are making selections.
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