SoxProspects News
|
|
|
|
Legal
Forum Ground Rules
The views expressed by the members of this Forum do not necessarily reflect the views of SoxProspects, LLC.
© 2003-2024 SoxProspects, LLC
|
|
|
|
|
Forum Home | Search | My Profile | Messages | Members | Help |
Welcome Guest. Please Login or Register.
Red Sox acquire Craig Kimbrel for Margot, Guerra +
|
Post by mgoetze on Dec 23, 2015 10:51:30 GMT -5
Teams have internal models they use that can differ from public ones. Of course they do. But in baseball no team analyst would say "well, the public stats are so out of whack, I wouldn't even bother looking at them." It's a completely different situation.
|
|
|
Post by mgoetze on Dec 23, 2015 10:57:46 GMT -5
Why is suggesting WAR may undervalue relievers arguendo? Fangraphs has an article that does just that, from a guy who didn't believe it before he started "discovering" it. So? FanGraphs hasn't actually changed their WAR formula yet. And my guess is at least part of the effect he measured is just that good relievers tend to have a BABIP suppression skill - I'm not taking that seriously until bWAR/RA9-WAR is included in the study to control for that.
|
|
|
Post by deepjohn on Dec 23, 2015 12:04:27 GMT -5
Mgoetze - you might want to try a decaffeinated brand. Your obvious erudition is being obscured by your gratuitously obstreperous tone. I think the economic models used to value players and prospects by the online community and those used by MLB front offices are clearly not in alignment. The source of this misalignment is worthy of sustained discussion and debate. One idea which I don't think is getting enough consideration is present value over future value. Almost every calculation invoked with regard to the recent spate of prospect for player trades adds up the prospect values as if the value of a prospect five years from now is the same as value added now. If the calculations use inflation then wins down the road are worth MORE than present day wins. That seems absurd intuitively. A bird in hand is worth two in the bush and all that. I don't pretend to understand the maths involved but that seems a pretty obvious point. Banks pay interest on money you deposit with them. Give them money and they will give you more down the road. Why? Because having the money in hand is worth more to them than money down the road. Wins up front, just like money up front, is always more valuable. The prospects involved in the Kimbrel trade are being vastly overrated. Their prospect sheen is a product of the RS hype machine and their collective youth. Kimbrel is a total beast at the back end of the bullpen. His WAR totals will not do justice to the impact he will have on this team. Wins now. The Price opt out is pure genius by DD. Let 33 yo Price walk after pitching like an ace for three years. Use the money from his and Kimbrel's expiring contracts to lock up Mookie or Xander or Moncada or Swihart or JBJ or Espinoza or Bientendi or Erod or Devers or a combination of any of the above to long term contracts. Wins now. And later. When you can win now without bankrupting the future, as the Sox did with the Kimbrel trade and the Price opt out, then you have the best of all possible outcomes. There's a forum member here dcsoxfan who's come upon the observation that trades of veterans for prospects (that he's looked at) yield two times more future wins given up than present wins received. Now a certain kind of mind will want to say, those teams made bad trades! All the risk was already accounted for in the mean! Ego smarter than all! But I think you are right to ask the more important question, why did the teams make those trades? What are the teams doing that's different from what the public statistician community seems to be doing? And it's not that hard to imagine, I don't think. If you are receiving a prospect that is very likely to have little to no value, as nearly two thirds of most prospects do (apart from the top most prospects), then your "perceived" risk is that you wind up with little or nothing in return. This is a very high perceived risk for you when everyone starts second-guessing you and complaining that the team got screwed. On the other side of the deal, your "perceived" risk is that you give up a future all-star, and get someone who really doesn't improve the team very much, and you still don't win in the clutch when it's so important that you do win. And now you're stuck with a big salary but you don't have the revenue that winning would have created. So how should this work, to mitigate the "perceived" risk? First, trade for the very best player you possibly can, accept no cheap substitutes, and look for a proven winner in clutch situations. Second, give up whatever you need to in players who are likely to fall into the two thirds of most prospects who have no value. If you are receiving prospects, and all you can get are players likely to fall into the two thirds of no value, then try to get several of them, so at least you can roll the dice several times. On both sides, Don't worry about the "expected value" of some mathematical concept. You are gambling with a very small sample size here, and you're all in. Choose a strategy that minimizes your "perceived" risk. Just to make it easy, everybody cut by half the "expected value" of players likely to fall into the two thirds of no value. I guess it's more complicated than that internally at the teams, and they use high-priced risk analysis (that I haven't studied yet, though it seems pretty straightforward). But the result seems to be the same. Double the present wins one side gets and you have the future wins the other side gets (credit goes to dcsoxfan for the observation).
|
|
|
Post by ramireja on Dec 23, 2015 12:34:03 GMT -5
I’m very late to the game here….and I get that the discussion of “did we trade too much for a reliever” is way past its prime , but if I may, a couple of thoughts to share:
I’m fairly convinced that the way we assign value to relievers is terribly flawed, specifically when we use WAR to assess a reliever’s value, and then we want to use that reliever WAR metric to compare to starters and/or position players. I think the latter part in particular (comparing WAR between relievers and starters) is what is flawed and here’s why:
WAR, even despite its known flaws, is best when used to compare players who play the same position. In that sense, I don’t mind comparing WAR between Kimbrel and say Uehara or O’Day. Even then, the metrics aren’t perfect but they probably do a reasonable job. HOWEVER, to compare Kimbrel’s WAR to say David Price’s WAR doesn’t make sense to me. That would assume that all innings are created equal and that Kimbrel’s performance in the late innings of close games should be weighted the same as a starter’s performance beginning in the 1st inning of a scoreless game.
To me (and please don’t tell me this exists already or I look like a fool), there would need to be some additional weighting of an inning’s leverage to account for the value that relievers bring to a team. The probability of a win throughout any one game depends on a number of factors, but the most important would be the score of the game and the current inning. As those variables fluctuate throughout the game, as does the probability of a win for either team. Starters always start their games in the 1st inning of a scoreless game. However, relievers are especially valuable because the manager gets to determine which innings they pitch, and if used properly, the best relievers will pitch the innings with the greatest value (win probability near 50% in late innings, in which the value of giving up or not giving a run has a large effect on the outcome of the game).
Wouldn’t we all agree that pitching a scoreless inning in a 4-3 game in the bottom of the 9th has more value (in terms of achieving a win), than pitching a scoreless inning in a 0-8 or even 8-0 game in the 5th inning? Further, wouldn’t we agree that giving up a run in a 4-3 game in the bottom of the 9th has a greater impact on the probability of a win, than giving up a run in a 0-0 game in the top of the 1st? WAR, to my knowledge, doesn’t factor that into account, and essentially we’re left with a metric that undervalues elite relievers who pitch in the most crucial, and hence, valuable innings of game. Its always bothered me to no end, when Keith Law makes some comment about how a team overpaid for a mere 60-70 innings from a reliever, when he doesn't acknowledge how crucial those innings are.
It wouldn’t surprise me if some analysts have created metrics to account for this, and therefore we’re seeing a little bump in the value of elite relievers in both the trade and FA markets.
|
|
|
Post by jmei on Dec 23, 2015 13:08:24 GMT -5
Sorry to have to point this out, but both bWAR and fWAR do include leverage for relievers. Basically, they multiply by the leverage of the situation divided by two (because of chaining). Add: here's more detail: www.fangraphs.com/blogs/war-and-relievers/
|
|
|
Post by Chris Hatfield on Dec 23, 2015 13:10:03 GMT -5
I'd point folks to the discussion of the trade in the recent podcast with Alex. I liked this thoughts on it a lot. By the way, I am pretty sure I asked when we were recording (not necessarily directly), but he agreed that unless some different definition of "prospect" was being used (like a U-25 list that included graduates), there's no way the Sox didn't value Margot as a top 10 prospect in the organization. Do you have a time marker in the podcast for that? I'm not sure where you mean. I wonder who are the two players he thinks the Red Sox would have put behind Margot then, from the list of Kopech, Johnson, Travis, Marrero, Chavis and Basabe? My sense is they would have preferred to trade Margot over any of these, and this takes you all the way to #11 if you include Guerra. In other words if you include Guerra, there were at least ten and possibly eleven players that the Red Sox would have protected while letting Margot go. Plus, since Margot at that time had the top 25 prospect rating attached to him, there was perhaps some value to be had, if they traded him quickly. We may or may not have remembered to get him on the record while recording. I'm comfortable saying that he agreed that the Red Sox internally considered Margot one of their top 10 prospects in the traditional definition of that term, in which "graduated" players wouldn't count.
|
|
|
Post by ramireja on Dec 23, 2015 13:16:28 GMT -5
Sorry to have to point this out, but both bWAR and fWAR do include leverage for relievers. Basically, they multiply by the leverage of the situation divided by two (because of chaining). Add: here's more detail: www.fangraphs.com/blogs/war-and-relievers/SON OF A!!!! Well, I would have been smart to look this up beforehand.....thanks for the info. If I get some time later, I'll take a peek at the specifics and see how much I agree with how they account for this leverage.
|
|
|
Post by jmei on Dec 23, 2015 13:26:12 GMT -5
Yeah, maybe you think leverage isn't the weighed heavily enough, which may be a fair criticism. The other reason WAR may underrate relievers is because of the oversized effect they have in the postseason. Since you can use your best relievers basically every game, they can pitch a higher proportion of innings in the playoffs (those innings will also be the highest-leverage innings all season). A similar case can be made for top of the rotation pitchers.
|
|
|
Post by jimed14 on Dec 23, 2015 13:42:17 GMT -5
Obviously, a different sport but same logic applies No, it doesn't. 1. Baseball is much easier to analyze than Football. 2. Baseball has been publicly analyzed longer and more extensively than Football. 3. The article discusses the intransparency of publicly available data in Football. This is indeed a large flaw of metrics like DVOA, QBR, or PFF rankings. In Baseball, the general method behind most metrics is well understood and has undergone extensive peer review. 4. Unlike in football, there has been significant interchange of personnel between baseball front offices and the public sphere. The Cubs surely didn't hire Tom Tango just to tell him to forget everything he's published and use some other model instead. Mike Fast quickly got hired by the Astros, but not before his pitch framing stats were disseminated to the general public. Tony Blengino is now writing at FanGraphs and previously worked for the Mariners. Bill James and Eric Van work(ed) for the Red Sox. Paul Swydan of the Hardball Times has experience in the Rockies organisation. And so on and so forth. And another thing in regards to football. You have to start somewhere. The analytics will improve over time.
|
|
|
Post by deepjohn on Dec 23, 2015 14:12:32 GMT -5
Do you have a time marker in the podcast for that? I'm not sure where you mean. I wonder who are the two players he thinks the Red Sox would have put behind Margot then, from the list of Kopech, Johnson, Travis, Marrero, Chavis and Basabe? My sense is they would have preferred to trade Margot over any of these, and this takes you all the way to #11 if you include Guerra. In other words if you include Guerra, there were at least ten and possibly eleven players that the Red Sox would have protected while letting Margot go. Plus, since Margot at that time had the top 25 prospect rating attached to him, there was perhaps some value to be had, if they traded him quickly. We may or may not have remembered to get him on the record while recording. I'm comfortable saying that he agreed that the Red Sox internally considered Margot one of their top 10 prospects in the traditional definition of that term, in which "graduated" players wouldn't count. At the time of the trade? At the time of the trade the team knew a lot more about the other prospects and about Margot. For example, they could see that Kopech was a power arm and Johnson was very nearly MLB ready, and that Travis was a 15 homer prospect also very nearly MLB ready. Those three one would think should rate ahead of Margot, who Speier said they rated as likely to be average but weak-hitting. Marrero had already shown how good his glove was in his MLB callup, making some buzz-worthy plays at all three positions he played, and his hitting was not a dealbreaker in that small sample size. In a traditional or at least old-fashioned view of prospects, he would rate ahead of Margot. So that leaves Basabe. Speier mentioned in his Baseball America chat that Margot was arguably blocked by Basabe, who so far displays all five tools, including an arm and power tool (unlike Margot), and at 19 is still growing. (Let's assume not Chavis but we need two, because Guerra would have been on the list) I'll try to follow up with him by Twitter or email and see what he says.
|
|
|
Post by deepjohn on Dec 23, 2015 14:26:39 GMT -5
Yeah, maybe you think leverage isn't the weighed heavily enough, which may be a fair criticism. The other reason WAR may underrate relievers is because of the oversized effect they have in the postseason. Since you can use your best relievers basically every game, they can pitch a higher proportion of innings in the playoffs (those innings will also be the highest-leverage innings all season). A similar case can be made for top of the rotation pitchers. Good points! There's also the "special sauce" factor that ericmvan has mentioned, derived I think from the extra wins that teams have with good relievers, compared to the WARs expected from the team's cumulative WARs. And then there's the analysis that says a higher ratio of shutdowns to meltdowns correlates with higher WPA. I guess what I haven't seen is a shutdown/meltdown analysis of leveraged innings.
|
|
|
Post by jimed14 on Dec 23, 2015 14:32:38 GMT -5
We may or may not have remembered to get him on the record while recording. I'm comfortable saying that he agreed that the Red Sox internally considered Margot one of their top 10 prospects in the traditional definition of that term, in which "graduated" players wouldn't count. At the time of the trade? At the time of the trade the team knew a lot more about the other prospects and about Margot. For example, they could see that Kopech and Johnson were power arms that were very nearly MLB ready, and that Travis and Chavis were 60-65 power prospects also very nearly MLB ready. Those four one would think should rate ahead of Margot, who Speier said they rated as likely to be average but weak-hitting. Marrero had already shown how good his glove was in his MLB callup, making some buzz-worthy plays at all three positions he played, and his hitting was not a dealbreaker in that small sample size. In a traditional or at least old-fashioned view of prospects, he would rate ahead of Margot. So that leaves Basabe. Speier mentioned in his Baseball America chat that Margot was arguably blocked by Basabe, who so far displays all five tools, including an arm and power tool (unlike Margot), and at 19 is still growing. I'll try to follow up with him by Twitter or email and see what he says. Am I completely missing something? Who in the entire world thinks that: 1) Chavis is a 60/65 prospect who is almost ready 2) Johnson is a power arm 3) Kopech is almost ready And Speier actually said that Margot was blocked by Basabe? Basabe is an infielder? I'm so confused.
|
|
|
Post by deepjohn on Dec 23, 2015 14:39:35 GMT -5
At the time of the trade? At the time of the trade the team knew a lot more about the other prospects and about Margot. For example, they could see that Kopech and Johnson were power arms that were very nearly MLB ready, and that Travis and Chavis were 60-65 power prospects also very nearly MLB ready. Those four one would think should rate ahead of Margot, who Speier said they rated as likely to be average but weak-hitting. Marrero had already shown how good his glove was in his MLB callup, making some buzz-worthy plays at all three positions he played, and his hitting was not a dealbreaker in that small sample size. In a traditional or at least old-fashioned view of prospects, he would rate ahead of Margot. So that leaves Basabe. Speier mentioned in his Baseball America chat that Margot was arguably blocked by Basabe, who so far displays all five tools, including an arm and power tool (unlike Margot), and at 19 is still growing. I'll try to follow up with him by Twitter or email and see what he says. Am I completely missing something? Who in the entire world thinks that: 1) Chavis is a 60/65 prospect who is almost ready 2) Johnson is a power arm 3) Kopech is almost ready And Speier actually said that Margot was blocked by Basabe? Basabe is an infielder? I'm so confused. There are two Basabe's I think, the one Speier is talking about is a centerfielder: news.soxprospects.com/2015/12/2015-season-in-review-luis-alexander.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitterClearly, you are right and I need to edit the part about Kopech, Johnson and Chavis, sorry. [Edit: fixed the post above. Thanks!]
|
|
|
Post by iakovos11 on Dec 23, 2015 14:49:47 GMT -5
At the time of the trade? At the time of the trade the team knew a lot more about the other prospects and about Margot. For example, they could see that Kopech and Johnson were power arms that were very nearly MLB ready, and that Travis and Chavis were 60-65 power prospects also very nearly MLB ready. Those four one would think should rate ahead of Margot, who Speier said they rated as likely to be average but weak-hitting. Marrero had already shown how good his glove was in his MLB callup, making some buzz-worthy plays at all three positions he played, and his hitting was not a dealbreaker in that small sample size. In a traditional or at least old-fashioned view of prospects, he would rate ahead of Margot. So that leaves Basabe. Speier mentioned in his Baseball America chat that Margot was arguably blocked by Basabe, who so far displays all five tools, including an arm and power tool (unlike Margot), and at 19 is still growing. I'll try to follow up with him by Twitter or email and see what he says. Am I completely missing something? Who in the entire world thinks that: 1) Chavis is a 60/65 prospect who is almost ready 2) Johnson is a power arm 3) Kopech is almost ready And Speier actually said that Margot was blocked by Basabe? Basabe is an infielder? I'm so confused. Wrong Basabe, Jim. He meant Luis Basabe ( - :
|
|
|
Post by iakovos11 on Dec 23, 2015 14:55:19 GMT -5
No, it doesn't. 1. Baseball is much easier to analyze than Football. 2. Baseball has been publicly analyzed longer and more extensively than Football. 3. The article discusses the intransparency of publicly available data in Football. This is indeed a large flaw of metrics like DVOA, QBR, or PFF rankings. In Baseball, the general method behind most metrics is well understood and has undergone extensive peer review. 4. Unlike in football, there has been significant interchange of personnel between baseball front offices and the public sphere. The Cubs surely didn't hire Tom Tango just to tell him to forget everything he's published and use some other model instead. Mike Fast quickly got hired by the Astros, but not before his pitch framing stats were disseminated to the general public. Tony Blengino is now writing at FanGraphs and previously worked for the Mariners. Bill James and Eric Van work(ed) for the Red Sox. Paul Swydan of the Hardball Times has experience in the Rockies organisation. And so on and so forth. And another thing in regards to football. You have to start somewhere. The analytics will improve over time. Maybe this goes to mgoetze's point #1, but the biggest difference for me is something Belichick has pointed out before, there's a lot of subjective evaluation in football analytics, far more than in baseball. Who get burned in pass coverage isn't so simple. Might be the guy closest, maybe the safety is supposed to get over there and maybe he's close or maybe he doesn't even get to the right side of the field, maybe it's a completely blown coverage and nobody knows who's responsibility it is (except the team that knows what coverage they were in), maybe the fault is equally split. Same thing for sacks and QB pressures. Which lineman gave that up? Sometimes it's easy to tell often times it's not. There's some of that subjectivity in baseball, but not nearly on the same level.
|
|
|
Post by Chris Hatfield on Dec 23, 2015 15:12:36 GMT -5
We may or may not have remembered to get him on the record while recording. I'm comfortable saying that he agreed that the Red Sox internally considered Margot one of their top 10 prospects in the traditional definition of that term, in which "graduated" players wouldn't count. At the time of the trade? At the time of the trade the team knew a lot more about the other prospects and about Margot. For example, they could see that Kopech was a power arm and Johnson was very nearly MLB ready, and that Travis was a 15 homer prospect also very nearly MLB ready. Those three one would think should rate ahead of Margot, who Speier said they rated as likely to be average but weak-hitting. Marrero had already shown how good his glove was in his MLB callup, making some buzz-worthy plays at all three positions he played, and his hitting was not a dealbreaker in that small sample size. In a traditional or at least old-fashioned view of prospects, he would rate ahead of Margot. So that leaves Basabe. Speier mentioned in his Baseball America chat that Margot was arguably blocked by Basabe, who so far displays all five tools, including an arm and power tool (unlike Margot), and at 19 is still growing. (Let's assume not Chavis but we need two, because Guerra would have been on the list) I'll try to follow up with him by Twitter or email and see what he says. Yes at the time of the trade. Please do not bother Alex about this or at least don't drag me into this. The Red Sox traded two players they valued highly because they thought it was worth it. I'm not sure what about that concept isn't getting through.
|
|
|
Post by jimed14 on Dec 23, 2015 15:13:12 GMT -5
Am I completely missing something? Who in the entire world thinks that: 1) Chavis is a 60/65 prospect who is almost ready 2) Johnson is a power arm 3) Kopech is almost ready And Speier actually said that Margot was blocked by Basabe? Basabe is an infielder? I'm so confused. There are two Basabe's I think, the one Speier is talking about is a centerfielder: news.soxprospects.com/2015/12/2015-season-in-review-luis-alexander.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitterClearly, you are right and I need to edit the part about Kopech, Johnson and Chavis, sorry. [Edit: fixed the post above. Thanks!] I can't believe no one called him on that. Luis is in Lowell. How could he block Margot? JBJ and Betts are(were) currently blocking Margot. Benintendi might have caught up to him but wasn't blocking him yet. Not just that, but who thinks Basabe is so much better than Margot that he was going to end up blocking him? This thread is taking a bizarre turn.
|
|
|
Post by Chris Hatfield on Dec 23, 2015 15:17:28 GMT -5
I can't believe no one called him on that. Luis is in Lowell. How could he block Margot? JBJ and Betts are(were) currently blocking Margot. Benintendi might have caught up to him but wasn't blocking him yet. Not just that, but who thinks Basabe is so much better than Margot that he was going to end up blocking him? Nobody called him on it because he didn't say it. The quote deepjohn is probably referring to is in response to a question about whether the Sox FO didn't value him as many thought, and he replied "He was valued plenty... But the Sox have Betts, Bradley, Benintendi, not to mention Basabe." He was referring to other young outfielders in the organization, not ones "blocking" him.
|
|
|
Post by deepjohn on Dec 23, 2015 15:25:41 GMT -5
I can't believe no one called him on that. Luis is in Lowell. How could he block Margot? JBJ and Betts are(were) currently blocking Margot. Benintendi might have caught up to him but wasn't blocking him yet. Not just that, but who thinks Basabe is so much better than Margot that he was going to end up blocking him? Nobody called him on it because he didn't say it. The quote deepjohn is probably referring to is in response to a question about whether the Sox FO didn't value him as many thought, and he replied "He was valued plenty... But the Sox have Betts, Bradley, Benintendi, not to mention Basabe." He was referring to other young outfielders in the organization, not ones "blocking" him. Yes, thanks, this is the reference I had in mind. Sorry I didn't appreciate the overtones of the words "arguably blocked" to those more experienced in the lingo. I guess a better way to put it is, well, the way that Speier put it.
|
|
|
Post by jimed14 on Dec 23, 2015 15:26:06 GMT -5
And another thing in regards to football. You have to start somewhere. The analytics will improve over time. Maybe this goes to mgoetze's point #1, but the biggest difference for me is something Belichick has pointed out before, there's a lot of subjective evaluation in football analytics, far more than in baseball. Who get burned in pass coverage isn't so simple. Might be the guy closest, maybe the safety is supposed to get over there and maybe he's close or maybe he doesn't even get to the right side of the field, maybe it's a completely blown coverage and nobody knows who's responsibility it is (except the team that knows what coverage they were in), maybe the fault is equally split. Same thing for sacks and QB pressures. Which lineman gave that up? Sometimes it's easy to tell often times it's not. There's some of that subjectivity in baseball, but not nearly on the same level. Definitely agree. The only things that work anything like football in baseball are things like an infielder having a great first basemen to make his fielding look better or a bad first baseman to make his fielding look worse. A lot of errors occur when a 1B doesn't make a good play. A lot of time an out is a combination of the plays of two different players. That happens in football on pretty much every play. For instance, I just don't see how you can judge a running back when there are defenders in the backfield on every handoff or a wide receiver who has a qb who cannot throw the ball to him accurately. There are other things in baseball that make things tricky, like how much a pitcher benefits from catcher framing or certain umpires, but that's more subtle I imagine.
|
|
|
Post by chavopepe2 on Dec 23, 2015 15:27:06 GMT -5
At the time of the trade? At the time of the trade the team knew a lot more about the other prospects and about Margot. For example, they could see that Kopech and Johnson were power arms that were very nearly MLB ready, and that Travis and Chavis were 60-65 power prospects also very nearly MLB ready. Those four one would think should rate ahead of Margot, who Speier said they rated as likely to be average but weak-hitting. Marrero had already shown how good his glove was in his MLB callup, making some buzz-worthy plays at all three positions he played, and his hitting was not a dealbreaker in that small sample size. In a traditional or at least old-fashioned view of prospects, he would rate ahead of Margot. So that leaves Basabe. Speier mentioned in his Baseball America chat that Margot was arguably blocked by Basabe, who so far displays all five tools, including an arm and power tool (unlike Margot), and at 19 is still growing. I'll try to follow up with him by Twitter or email and see what he says. Am I completely missing something? Who in the entire world thinks that: 1) Chavis is a 60/65 prospect who is almost ready 2) Johnson is a power arm 3) Kopech is almost ready And Speier actually said that Margot was blocked by Basabe? Basabe is an infielder? I'm so confused. Confused is an understatement. I'm not sure where you come up with this stuff. I've never seen anyone in my years on this board so tirelessly try to cram a square peg into a round hole. Margot is an excellent prospect. The Red Sox valued him highly, but DD made the decision it was good value to move him for Kimbrel.
|
|
|
Post by deepjohn on Dec 23, 2015 15:32:03 GMT -5
At the time of the trade? At the time of the trade the team knew a lot more about the other prospects and about Margot. For example, they could see that Kopech was a power arm and Johnson was very nearly MLB ready, and that Travis was a 15 homer prospect also very nearly MLB ready. Those three one would think should rate ahead of Margot, who Speier said they rated as likely to be average but weak-hitting. Marrero had already shown how good his glove was in his MLB callup, making some buzz-worthy plays at all three positions he played, and his hitting was not a dealbreaker in that small sample size. In a traditional or at least old-fashioned view of prospects, he would rate ahead of Margot. So that leaves Basabe. Speier mentioned in his Baseball America chat that Margot was arguably blocked by Basabe, who so far displays all five tools, including an arm and power tool (unlike Margot), and at 19 is still growing. (Let's assume not Chavis but we need two, because Guerra would have been on the list) I'll try to follow up with him by Twitter or email and see what he says. Yes at the time of the trade. Please do not bother Alex about this or at least don't drag me into this. The Red Sox traded two players they valued highly because they thought it was worth it. I'm not sure what about that concept isn't getting through. Sure thing! I'm a long-time fan of his since his earliest work, and he has on occasion written to me, but I'll not ask about this if you'd prefer.
|
|
|
Post by deepjohn on Dec 23, 2015 15:36:18 GMT -5
Am I completely missing something? Who in the entire world thinks that: 1) Chavis is a 60/65 prospect who is almost ready 2) Johnson is a power arm 3) Kopech is almost ready And Speier actually said that Margot was blocked by Basabe? Basabe is an infielder? I'm so confused. Confused is an understatement. I'm not sure where you come up with this stuff. I've never seen anyone in my years on this board so tirelessly try to cram a square peg into a round hole. Margot is an excellent prospect. The Red Sox valued him highly, but DD made the decision it was good value to move him for Kimbrel. I take the hint that I've said enough (or perhaps too much).
|
|
|
Post by jimed14 on Dec 23, 2015 15:38:06 GMT -5
Am I completely missing something? Who in the entire world thinks that: 1) Chavis is a 60/65 prospect who is almost ready 2) Johnson is a power arm 3) Kopech is almost ready And Speier actually said that Margot was blocked by Basabe? Basabe is an infielder? I'm so confused. Confused is an understatement. I'm not sure where you come up with this stuff. I've never seen anyone in my years on this board so tirelessly try to cram a square peg into a round hole. Margot is an excellent prospect. The Red Sox valued him highly, but DD made the decision it was good value to move him for Kimbrel. That's exactly how I see it. Margot isn't all of a sudden a certain bust who isn't going to make the majors because of his splits vs RHP. But that seems like the angle some are pushing. He was expendable because of redundancy, not because they were so down on him. And that angle is most of the argument that the Red Sox didn't pay as much as people think, but they did. People can like Kimbrel and like the trade but there's no point in going down this path of post-hoc justification as if they got a steal and that these prospects aren't worth crap and will bust and we don't need them and they're now completely overrated now that it's December and not October and the Red Sox would have never traded them if they weren't down on them because they're smarter than us and everyone else.
|
|
|
Post by jmei on Dec 23, 2015 18:10:02 GMT -5
Just about no one thought Margot was a worse prospect than Kopech or Travis before this trade, let alone Basabe. You can look back at the community prospect ranking thread and the "Margot vs. Benintendi" thread, for instance. As has been mentioned, you can justify this trade without diving headfirst into "2 + 2 = 5" style mental gymnastics.
|
|
|